This article undertakes analysis of misuse of private information (MPI) case law informed by deconstruction and wider literary and critical theory. It specifically considers the operation of the 'balance' metaphor in MPI case law: What rhetorical effects might it foster, and how? What insights can the balance metaphor in MPI case law reveal about the nature of legal discourse more generally? This article starts by providing an account of select theorists who explore the subtle but vital role that metaphor plays in non-literary texts. Though metaphors have traditionally been viewed as poetic or literary devices, deconstruction indicates that they often exert a hidden influence in the texts of other disciplines such as philosophy and law, with inevitable implications for claims based on truth, objectivity and reason. This account ultimately highlights the fundamental -but often overlooked -role of metaphor in legal discourse. Following this discussion, the article proceeds to investigate the key 'balance' metaphor in misuse of private information judgments. It identifies and analyses two distinct ways in which the balance metaphor subtly benefits and supports judicial reasoning in these judgments. First, it creates an impression of certainty by drawing on connotations of the quantifiable and calculable. Second, it fosters the moral appeal of a decision by alluding to notions of justice and equilibrium. In doing so, the balance metaphor marginalises the non-rational, inexpressible, even mysterious, aspects of judicial rights balancing. "What then is truth? a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthromorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations which were poetically and rhetorically heightened, transferred, and adorned, and after long use seem solid, canonical, and binding to a nation. Truths are illusions about which it has been forgotten that they are illusions, worn-out metaphors without sensory impact, coins which have lost their image and now can be used only as metal, and no longer as coins."
Introduction
Lawyers, like poets, are no strangers to metaphor. For example, legal discourse has adopted the notion of 'ripeness' for judicial review, 1 likened property rights to 'bundles of sticks', 2 excluded evidence as the 'fruit of the poisonous tree, 3 implicitly condemned claimants' 'fishing expeditions' 4 and retained Lockean agrarian imagery in copyright. 5 Law then, it seems, has its very own mobile army of metaphors. This article is concerned with one particular metaphor, that of 'balance'. The notion of balance is widely used within, and long associated with, law; in particular it constitutes 'one of the central features of postwar Western legal thought and practice '. 6 This article focuses on the role of the 'balance' metaphor in the specific context of misuse of private information jurisprudence.
Misuse of private information (MPI) is a relatively new doctrine that has emerged from a series of post-Human Rights Act 1998 legal disputes, many involving high profile claimants seeking to restrain 1 publication of personal information by tabloid defendants. 7 The core of the action is an 'interright conflict' 8 between the Article 8 right of privacy 9 and the Article 10 right to free expression, 10 and to manage this conflict judges have created the 'balancing exercise'. Elsewhere, the author has undertaken deconstructive analysis of this binary opposition, examining how Articles 8 and 10 and their primary underlying dichotomy, 'public interest' versus 'interesting the public', are in some senses reversible, mutually reliant and not entirely distinct. 11 That analysis revealed some of the culturally specific assumptions that silently shape understandings of the public interest dichotomy, including Enlightenment-era ideals of intellectual debate, objective truth and democratic participation and the related privileging of political over non-political speech, the serious over the trivial etc. It also found that the notion of the 'public' across MPI discourse is subject to varying constructions for rhetorical ends, shifting from empowered consumers to politically engaged citizens to the voyeuristic masses according to speaker, agenda and context. However, another strand of deconstructive thought has further insights to reveal in this area, namely its concern with the role of metaphor in discourse.
This article undertakes analysis of MPI caselaw informed by deconstruction and wider literary and critical theory. First, it provides an account of select theorists who explore the subtle but vital role that metaphor plays in non-literary texts. It pays particular attention to Derrida's work on metaphor, though academic interest in metaphor extends far beyond deconstruction. This discussion of the shared origins and history of metaphor and rhetoric is valuable here for three reasons. First it highlights the various hierarchies operative across political-philosophical history; hierarchies that remain influential, particularly in law and therefore MPI specifically. Second it shows that metaphors, often hidden, play a rhetorical role in discourses such as philosophy or science, with inevitable implications for claims based on truth, objectivity and reason. Third it demonstrates the crucial role of metaphors in legal discourse generally, and the role of such metaphors in constituting and shaping our experiences. The second part of this article proceeds to investigate the use of 'balance' as a metaphor in MPI judgments. It considers the rhetorical effect of the rights-'weighting'
process, asking what underlying subjectivities such metaphors might betray, what rhetorically beneficial assumptions they might engender.
[1] Metaphor, Rhetoric & Law
A metaphor is form of trope, the essence of which entails 'understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another'. 12 It is a device whereby a speaker refers to two different things at once, e.g. by a drawing a comparison, link or substituting one term for another, the second term being redeployed in a different context. In doing so metaphor draws upon similarities or resemblance between the two things. Metaphor has been traditionally viewed as a figurative or poetic form of expression, as distinct from literal, descriptive speech. Unlike the latter, it entails an open-ended form of communication, 'pregnant' with meaning and mystery, drawing links across contexts. Metaphors are seen as non-rational, appealing to the senses (especially visual senses) and playing on emotional responses. One such example is provided in the seminal Illness as Metaphor, where Sontag critiques the various metaphors that recur in literary depictions of cancer and tuberculosis. 13 She analyses cancer's portrayal as a parasite and a form of contamination, and the 'language of warfare' 14 with which it is depicted. For Sontag, such imagery cumulatively instils undue fear and dread regarding the disease and is thus ultimately misleading. Despite this (or perhaps because of it) cancer comes to be adopted in turn as a metaphor in other disciplines. For example, in a political context cancer is a 'specifically polemical' disease; 15 describing an issue as a social cancer highlights the severity of the matter, raises the stakes and justifies drastic measures.
[1.1] Classical Views of Rhetoric & Metaphor
The origins and characteristics of metaphor are closely entwined with that of rhetoric. Rhetoric, the art of using language to persuade an audience of a particular position, emerged to prominence with the sophists in classical Greek culture. Metaphor was viewed as a rhetorical device which could aid persuasion. Successful participation in the Athenian democratic system necessitated skills of persuasion on the political stage and particularly in the law courts. 17 The origins of rhetoric are thus at least partly legal.
Plato was highly critical of rhetoric as a practice 18 and denounced it in two of his dialogues Gorgias: 'I'm talking about the ability to use the spoken word to persuade -to persuade the jurors in the courts, the members of the Council, the citizens attending the Assembly -in short, to win over any and every form of public meeting in the citizen body.' ibid 452e-453a. claiming that Plato's text 'manifests a series of slidings … that are highly significant'.
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The sign 'pharmakon' is used to contain a selection of oppositions, 68 the most significant of which is that between speech (logos) over writing, a privileging seen throughout figurative and symbolic devices in apparently rational, technical judgments may show that they are beset at some level by certain unarticulated politics, emotions or subjectivities that they explicitly claim to avoid. As Douzinas states:
"A concern with the figures of the legal text or with the symbolic structure and context of law … is a concern with a series of highly political yet largely unquestioned aspects of legal governance. The critical scholar attends to the marginal, the peripheral or the surface precisely so as to recapture the politics which has escaped the text, or has been hidden beneath its ritual paraphernalia."
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The preceding discussion in this part affords illuminating insights pertinent to the balance metaphor in misuse of private information caselaw. It has highlighted the often-suppressed figurative, imaginative nature of legal discourse, and indicated that these essential characteristics are at odds with law's selfpresentation. It has also revealed the unavoidable historically-and culturally-specific hierarchies that inform legal discourse and thus modern rights-balancing techniques. Finally, the discussion here suggests that the balance metaphor does not merely represent -but may actually constitute -judicial understandings of rights conflicts in MPI caselaw. It is to that caselaw that discussion now turns. But nonetheless, these US and German traditions have influenced contemporary understandings of balance, the latter playing a particularly prominent role in the metaphor's European meaning. 132 The role of 'balance' in misuse of private information caselaw must be viewed against the backdrop of such influences.
It should be noted that a number of salient metaphors populate MPI caselaw in addition to that of 'balance'. Note for example the recurring vigilant media 'watchdog', 133 an idealisation that implicitly 'casts the media as observer, scrutiniser and also guardian, protector of the public'. 134 Another highly significant metaphor in MPI cases, and indeed wider law, is the metaphor of line-drawing as adopted in Flitcroft 135 and Browne. 136 This line-drawing device, an integral feature of adjudication, has the effect of implying a clear, distinct divide wherever the line is situated; it envisages an issue in spatial terms, definitively splitting it into two clear 'areas' or categories, where a case or set of facts will fall on one side or the other. Yet, it is arguable that 'balance' is the most prominent and influential metaphor in MPI and its metaphorical nature has been acknowledged by leading commentators, though not subject to further metaphor-based scrutiny. The term 'balance' is French but has Latin origins, having evolved from an amalgamation of 'bi'
(meaning double) and 'lanx' (meaning a metal dish or pair of scales).
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'Balance' has the following dictionary meanings: In media privacy caselaw the term 'balance' is primarily used in two key senses. First and foremost, it is used as a transitive verb (definition (7)), i.e. to depict the process of balancing objects, in this case the 'objects' being rights. Related to this, judgments use 'balance' to refer to the specific act of weighing two things (as in definition (5)). It is interesting to note that in each of these meanings, the act of balancing produces equilibrium; this is discussed further in part 2.3 below. Second, 'balance' is employed to refer to a set of scales, an instrument for weighing (as per definition (6) and the term's Latin origins); this use is significant and now warrants further attention.
Balance: the scales metaphor
Actual references to 'scales' in the weighing process are present across caselaw, including Douglas, It is conventional in that it forms part of our culture's ordinary conceptual system, as reflected by its widespread usage in legal -and indeed wider political -discourse. 160 Furthermore it is structural in nature because it allows lawyers to orient, quantify, discuss and structure rights adjudication. 161 As is common in other structural metaphors, the balance metaphor enables this because the defining concept (BALANCING SCALES) is 'more clearly delineated in our experience and typically more concrete' than the defined concept (ADJUDICATING RIGHTS). 162 The Part 1 discussed numerous theorists who have analysed the rhetorical effect of metaphor across various discourses. Informed by such literature, it is arguable that the balancing metaphor discreetly brings two distinct but related rhetorical advantages that will now be discussed in turn.
[2.2] The Certainty of the Quantitative
First, the balancing exercise connotes a seemingly objective, 163 scientific 164 and precise 165 weighting process; one to be undertaken in relation to two objects, two 'things' with a physical presence.
Gauging weight is a quantitative process and this language thus gives a sense of the quantifiable 166 in Derrida's terms, the 'calculable'.
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It is arguably influenced by Aristotle's notion of rectificatory justice, that form of particular justice whereby a judge restores the precise status quo when an injustice has occurred between parties. Aristotle's account of rectificatory justice also draws upon quantitative imagery, viewing it in terms of unequal lines, the longer of which has its excess halved and transferred to the shorter. 168 The likely influence of German jurisprudence should also be noted "We are suggesting that frequently what is required is not a technical approach to the law but a balancing of the facts. The weight which should be attached to each relevant consideration will vary depending on the precise circumstances. In many situations the balance may not point clearly in either direction."
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Even allowing for the fact that the Campbell and Flitcroft judgments were provided at the earliest stages of the emerging MPI doctrine, these passages are revealing. The latter passage candidly acknowledges that 'balancing' in this context is actually variable, non-technical and, by implication, subjective. Furthermore, in 'many' cases the outcome will be uncertain, with scope for the process to . This undermines the impression subtly fostered by the metaphor that the balancing exercise is scientific or objective in nature. Furthermore, it indicates that the balancing exercise is fundamentally different in nature to the balancing of objects in scales, despite the recurrent use of that image; unlike theoretical, metaphysical rights balancing, using scales allows the weight of a particular item to be factually quantified with certainty. Yet such mixed judicial statements also perhaps reflect an ambiguity inherent in the balance metaphor: are the rights are weighed with reference to an 'external', objective scale, or relative to one another? The imagery of scales suggests both.
The enduring influence of 'balance' in modern human rights discourse is perhaps a reflection of our broader political-bureaucratic culture, with its emphasis on reductive rationalities, binary ends/means trade-offs and social-scientific approaches to crucial community issues. 182 Yet, as White argues, the work of lawyers is inherently creative 183 and legal reasoning works by a range of methods, many of which are distinctly non-scientific. 184 The balance metaphor in MPI is particularly paradoxical; a literary device that discreetly draws on the stature of science. Yet even this quantitative, reifying metaphor entails a subtle rhetoric of its own, its power resting on its implicit claims to be nonrhetorical. In Fish's terms, 'Impersonal method [e.g. of the balancing sort] … is both an illusion and a danger (as a kind of rhetoric it masks its rhetorical nature)'.
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Exposing the connotations of calculability and certainty sedimented in the balance metaphor necessarily entails facing uncertainty. Yet, for White, this is an inevitable feature of life, and the lawyerly 'process of meaning-making and community-building … requires him or her to face and accept the condition of radical uncertainty in which we live: uncertainty as to the meaning of words, uncertainty as to their effect on others, uncertainty even as to our own motivations.' 186 Thus perhaps 'balance' acts as a convenient fiction which overlays an inherently creative, subjective and, to some extent, inexpressible interpretive activity. 187 Ricoeur, for example, notes 'the capacity of metaphor to provide untranslatable information'. 188 Perhaps what the term seeks to represent remains a process the core of which will inevitably elude attempts to articulate, categorise or systematise it. This possibility is embraced by White, who writes:
"In forcing us to the limits of expression and of our minds, [reading law as literature] is a commitment to openness, to the recognition of mystery, to the value of what no-one has yet found the words to say or do. In all of this we must perpetually acknowledge that we have something to learn." Though 'balance' in MPI judgements refers to either the process of balancing or a set of scales, a further meaning becomes significant in this context; balance as equilibrium and harmony (as in the dictionary definitions (1)-(4)). These additional meanings of 'balance' refer to a state of affairs and, in the context of MPI caselaw, imply that equilibrium, an optimum outcome, is capable of being achieved. In this sense, the scales form a recurring figurative device conveying an implicit message; that via the balancing exercise order is achieved, equilibrium restored. Deconstructive readings consider the effect of 'traces' of other meanings within terms employed; the implicit meanings of 'balance' in its other senses (e.g. scales, order, equilibrium, harmony, stability)
199 are also at play in media privacy judgments and their influence cannot be discounted. by the interpretation, a constructive interpretation. 210 At the level of abstract value the authors are selecting one particular conception of free expression from many, 211 and one particular conception of privacy from many, in order to find them mutually supportive. This choice, though certainly justifiable, is also eminently contestable. An alternative view is that the 'brute confrontation' between Arts 8 & 10 also inescapably occurs at the level of principle. What judgments provide is certainly a resolution, but it is arguably not one that successfully eradicates the conflict between Arts 8/10 at a more fundamental level. Instead the resolution rests on merely one interpretation that has been preferenced over many other possible interpretations, and as such it represents a political choice. The rhetoric of 'balance' cannot truly resolve; it can only justify the imposed legal outcome, reflecting Goodrich's claim that "The telos [end goal] of rhetorical speech is victory rather than cure". 220 Yet herein lies a vital ambiguity at the heart of the balance metaphor. Alongside its connotations of moral appeal and equilibrium balance simultaneously represents the inescapably binary nature of judicial decisions. 221 For Daube the scales express 'a deep-rooted tendency to see no shades between black and white, to admit no degrees of right and wrong, to allow no distribution of loss and gain among several litigants, to send a party away either victorious or defeated.' 222 In the end, legal disputes necessitate an inevitable outcome or 'answer' that judgment must provide; for Loughlin this is a crucial connotation of the scales imagery.
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Conclusion
The balancing of Articles 8 & 10 is an integral part of MPI caselaw and the 'balance' metaphor fulfils a discreet but crucial persuasive role in two ways. First, it marginalises the non-rational, inexpressible, even mysterious, aspects of judicial rights-balancing and constructs the process by emphasising the quantifiable, concrete properties of 'balancing' rights. Second, it simultaneously highlights and mitigates the zero-sum outcome of litigation. In doing so, 'balance' transgresses the implicit divides between the rational and the imaginative, the quantifiable and unquantifiable, objective and subjective. It forms an important rhetorical device that benefits each individual judgment, the institution of law more generally and, in turn, parties or interests the law may tend to 218 favour. This is significant in light of the wider influence of the balance metaphor beyond mediaprivacy disputes, particularly in in counter-terrorism discourse for example.
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This article does not claim that the subjugation of either privacy or free expression in particular cases is a 'bad thing' per se. Waldron defends 'rights trade-offs' of the sort in MPI caselaw. His quite reasonable point is that moral conflicts between parties are an unavoidable fact and "it is important not to saddle the proponent of [rights] trade-offs with responsibility for the actual existence of moral conflicts … [A] hard choice has to be made on any account, and the only way of mitigating its hardness is to diminish the concern we feel about one or both of the options. It is not the fault of the theorist [or presumably judge] who proposes trade-offs". 225 This article does not seek to 'blame the judge' charged with deciding the case as it comes before them, but it does use MPI caselaw to question more generally law's narrative about itself. It also invites us to become more attuned to the presence and influence of metaphors across legal discourse more generally, and the paradoxes they may both express and obscure.
226
As Ross claims, 'we cannot stay in the shelter of our unexamined metaphors.' warns us not to assume that equilibrium is ultimately achieved via the balancing process. It disputes the impression that an intractable inter-right conflict can be made to conveniently disappear, or 224 Consistent criticisms have been made of the liberty v security 'balance' metaphor by MacDonald, though he does not undertake a metaphor-based analysis. He claims 'balance' obscures and simplifies and the complex relation between liberty and security, for example by assuming a basic, binary hydraulic relation between the two (i.e. when one goes up, the other goes down). The balancing metaphor is also insensitive to the issues being weighed and it prevents the opening up of decision-making to consideration of other perspectives. 
